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D7GPGOTC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 ESTATE OF ERNEST GOTTDIENER, 3 ET AL., 4 Plaintiffs, v. 13 CV 1824 (LGS) 5 FELIX SATER AND SALVATORE 6 LAURIA, 7 Defendants. -----x 8 New York, N.Y. July 16, 2013 9 12:24 a.m. Before: 10 HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, 11 District Judge **APPEARANCES** 12 MUNDIE LAW FIRM Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 BY: FREDERICK M. OBERLANDER, ESQ. and 14 THE LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD E. LERNER, P.C. BY: RICHARD E. LERNER, ESQ. 15 BEYS, STEIN & MOBARGHA, LLP 16 Attorneys for Defendant Felix Sater BY: JOSHUA D. LISTON, ESQ. 17 NADER MOBARGHA, ESQ. SATTERLEE, STEPHENS, BURKE & BURKE, LLP 18 Attorneys for Defendants in 2010 case, BayRock LLC, BayRock Spring Street LLC, BayRock Whitestone LLC, BayRock 19 Camelback LLC, and BayRock Merrimac LLC 20 BY: WALTER A. SAURACK, ESQ. ZOE E. JASPER, ESQ. 21 22 23 24 25

1 (In open court)

(Case called)

THE COURT: We're now moving to the third case, which is 13 CV 1824. It's estate of Ernest Gottdiener versus Sater, and there are only two defendants here, Felix Sater and Salvatore Lauria, as I understand it. And given that, the other counsel are welcome to stay, but the other counsel are also welcome to leave because we're going to address just this case now.

With respect to this case, I understand that service was made and counsel has appeared, in some sense, for both defendants, but you are not showing up as having entered an appearance on ECF. So if I could just ask you to do that, that would be great.

MR. MOBARGHA: Yes, of course. We will file a notice of appearance within the next 24 hours.

THE COURT: Thank you. So if I could ask the plaintiff again, what is this case about, and how is this different from the two that we talked about already?

MR. OBERLANDER: Complete -- Well, I can't say it's completely unrelated. Six degrees of separation. We could find something. Roughly from '93 to '98, pervasively in the Southern District but with tendrils that reached out to a lot of others, including the Eastern District, a very great many bucket shops or basically crooked, fly-by-night stockbroker

operations popped up that were, in varying degrees, associated with generally Italian organized crime or the Mafia, however you call it, sometimes Russian and sometimes both.

There was a great deal of litigation in the early part of this millennium, 2000 to 2005, all over the Eastern and Southern District, dozens of cases. This is basically a civil residue of one of them. In this case, there was — obviously, I'll be very careful. These are allegations, but they're also taken directly from criminal informations to which people have pled guilty and indictments to which people have pled guilty and, therefore, they're more than mere allegations. They're, at least as to the indictments, true with probable cause.

There was an association in fact RICO enterprise consisting of some 20, 25 people. Among them were Felix Sater, Salvatore Lauria, Alfred Palagonia, quite a few others. It doesn't matter. Now, the general overall objective of that racketeering enterprise was to perpetrate securities fraud, specifically by getting customers to buy stocks not knowing that the brokerages and their buddies in the association secretly controlled large blocks.

And these proverbial little old ladies would be induced with high-pressure boiler room sales tactics into buying stock, not knowing the truth, not knowing that brokers were being bribed to promote it. And then, of course, it would be run up and sold into, and they'd be left with worthless

stock. And it's called pump and dump, and the details of it are really almost unimportant. But that's essentially what we're talking about, pump and dump, boiler room securities fraud.

Now, my client --

THE COURT: And so is it, more or less, I mean, separate than from the other actions?

MR. OBERLANDER: Yes. It doesn't have to stay that way, but I'm not trying to be deceptive to you.

THE COURT: No, no, no.

MR. OBERLANDER: The damages claim --

THE COURT: I'll to be clear to you, I haven't been able to put all of the complaints together to sort out what is what. So I was hoping you might just make that simple for me.

MR. OBERLANDER: Absolutely. Here's what we got.

Mr. Sater did some bad things. Whether he reformed or not is beside the point. He did some bad things; so did Mr. Lauria, and they pled guilty to doing them in 1998. That's when they pled guilty. The things that they did were during the five years before that, '93 to '98, roughly.

Now, all those other cases deal with what happened after 1998. They deal with what happened when Mr. Sater, while he was serving as a cooperator, infiltrated and acquired the majority ownership of BayRock and used it to commit crime, and people who facilitated that and covered it up for him, that's

what those cases are about.

In this case, we're dealing with some elderly people, Holocaust survivors who entrusted a large part of their life savings to brokerages in 19 -- or to one broker during '93 to '98 and lost money.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it. Thank you.

MR. OBERLANDER: All right? Now, obviously, they have claims, the Gottdieners, against people who joined a conspiracy after the securities fraud and kept it going 15 years to hide the truth from them. That's why they're plaintiffs in the case Mr. Sater removed. So what happened here is that these are the -- this case is the Gottdieners suing Mr. Sater and Mr. Lauria in civil RICO for the losses they suffered in securities fraud from '93 to '98. That's what this case is about.

But they could have and should have got their money back by suing them a lot earlier. They should have got restitution a lot earlier. They didn't. They have claims against a lot of people who, after the securities fraud, acted with the specific intent of frustrating them and all the other victims. That's the 3905 case we dealt with first.

This is strictly the case about the -- I mean, I could have pled it. Yeah, I could have enjoined it all over the place.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. OBERLANDER: In this case, we have the Gottdieners suing Mr. Sater and Mr. Lauria because they lost \$7 million in securities fraud. Now, the wrinkle here, and I'm sure my colleague will bring this up to you and we agree on a lot, believe it or not, trust not on the law. The wrinkle here is that the damage that was done to them in the securities fraud seems — and don't hold me to this, but at the latest, to have occurred in 1998, certainly not long after that. We're dealing with damages that accrued to them 15 years later.

The cause of action didn't accrue civilly against

Mr. Sater until 2009 because civil RICO provision Title 18

1964-C says that no one may bring an action for RICO by relying
on conduct that would be actionable as securities fraud unless
and until there's been a conviction. In which case, the
statute of limitations, which everyone agrees is four years,
begins to run when the conviction becomes final.

It is our position that the phrase "conviction becomes final" wasn't redundant for the hell of it; that while a conviction may be said to have occurred upon entry of a guilty plea, a conviction becomes final only when the judgment and conviction order is docketed and/or time for appeal expires.

Mr. Sater was sentenced on October 23rd, 2009.

Presumably, he had -- if he hadn't waived appeal, he had 14 days from there; so somewhere around October, November 2009

Mr. Stater's conviction became final. There must be several

hundred cases on the phrase "conviction becomes final." When does finality occur? Most of them are in the habeas context, obviously, because of the one-year limitation there.

There is no case in history that has ever held that conviction becomes final when somebody enters a plea of guilty particularly because, among other things, when you're subject to a cooperation agreement, if you violate it and commit crimes, guess what? Everything changes, and it's all done all over again.

So we brought this case with respect to Mr. Sater pursuant to a quirk in the law that is there for real, unambiguously clear, that starting October 23rd, 2009, for the next four years, everybody he is liable to from 15, 20 years ago can first sue him. As to Mr. — in RICO, nothing else that we know of but in RICO.

Mr. Lauria, his conviction became final in
February 2004, but his case didn't exist in public records
until it was, for want of a better term, unsealed by order of a
magistrate for Judge Glasser on March 22, 2009. So the
earliest that anybody could have known his conviction became
final was March 22, 2009. And we filed this case on
March 18th, 2013.

And our position with respect to Mr. Lauria is that the statute of limitations had to have been tolled during the entire time everything was being kept secret, concealed,

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sealed, whatever you want to call it. You can't hold
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      plaintiffs to knowing about something where the courts have
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      gone out of their way to make certain that nobody did.
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               THE COURT: Let's -- We've been here a long time.
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               MR. OBERLANDER: But that's the facts.
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               THE COURT: I understand, and I have your pre-motion
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      letters. And we don't need to have oral argument before
      anybody files any papers. So would you like to be heard?
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               MR. MOBARGHA: Yes. One thing that I just want to
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      address in this conference is, if there's any pleading
      deficiencies or statute of limitation issues that the
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     plaintiffs are about to address, and they've hinted at that in
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      their letter, that they would maybe like to amend their
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      complaint to --
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               THE COURT: I thought somewhere he said he wasn't
      amending one word of his complaint.
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               MR. OBERLANDER: Want me to answer or --
               THE COURT: Well, let --
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               MR. MOBARGHA:
                              The reason why --
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               THE COURT: Yes, let me hear you.
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               MR. MOBARGHA: The reason I bring this up is if we
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      were to file a motion to dismiss, which we are going to do --
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               THE COURT: Right.
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               MR. MOBARGHA: -- we would like to make sure that the
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      complaint we're going to be dismissing won't be amended, making
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our motion moot. It's, therefore, for efficiency purposes we can actually just dismiss the complaint that the plaintiffs actually are going to stick by at this point. This will just make it more efficient for the Court and all the parties involved.

I'm not going to get into all the rebuttals for what plaintiff has mentioned, but basically, this case is, as plaintiffs have admitted, is over. It's about 15 to 20 years old and the statute of limitations is four years. And while securities fraud, the statute begins to run when the conviction is final, we believe that that was when he entered a plea of guilty back in 1998. Therefore, the statute of limitations for Mr. Sater and Mr. Lauria expired in 2002.

What the position the plaintiffs are taking here is that defendants' ten years of unparalleled cooperation with the Eastern District somehow should act as a toll to continuously toll their — the time they have to file whatever civil RICO action that they want to. I don't think that was the intent of the statute, but we can get into that in the papers. I don't want to waste the Court's time any more than we already have.

But I just want to get into, though, is while securities fraud has a specific way of calculating the statute of limitations issue, they still need another predicate act for civil RICO. And through their correspondence, it seems that they're hinting that the second predicate act that they're

basing their civil RICO claim on is bribery. And bribery, unfortunately for the plaintiffs, still, the statute begins to run when plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered that their economic loss could be attributed to this bribery.

So whether the conviction is final or not for the second predicate act is irrelevant. The statute begins to run back when the plaintiff should have discovered their injury.

And the other reason I wanted to bring up the potential amendment of their complaint is because, you know, civil RICO, the pleading standards for civil RICO are very onerous. And basically just attaching the conviction of Mr. Sater and Lauria for their White Rock — alleged White Rock criminal enterprise and imputing all of those actions onto Blair and Palagonia, who were the actual brokers who sold the securities to the plaintiff, is not enough. And there's cases that say you can't just basically base a civil RICO on some loose narration that's attached.

They actually have to tie the facts to the elements. So if they want to do that, I'm happy to wait for them to do that in an amended complaint, but I just want to make sure that, you know, at this point, that they either make a decision to file an amended complaint or I can just move to dismiss their current complaint as it is.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So I'll hear from the plaintiff. I mean, I do have a procedure whereby the plaintiff

can either respond or file an amended complaint, but if there's a way to be more efficient --

MR. OBERLANDER: Oh, there most certainly is, if you'll forgive me, maybe --

THE COURT: That's fine, please.

MR. OBERLANDER: Okay. I think -- I assume we all understand it's implicit that I disagree with how he characterized the law, right?

THE COURT: Yes. We all understand that, and we'll read about it in the papers.

MR. OBERLANDER: We're past that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. OBERLANDER: It isn't my job in a complaint to satisfy anything about limitations periods. It's an affirmative defense or it's a jurisdictional objection. It isn't my job to deal with it. Now, I wrote a legally proper complaint, but — and I can be better, like we all can. I do an extensive amount of consulting in civil RICO, and there are two kinds of RICO complaints, bad ones and really long, complicated ones, I'm afraid, and that's just the way it is.

But what there isn't ever, you're never going to find it. It's come up two times in reported cases in 30 years, is a RICO complaint brought by a plaintiff who was the criminal victim of the defendant who pled guilty to actual information setting everything out. So as a very brief statement here,

I've got an 86-page grand jury indictment of Alfred Palagonia, which lists Felix Sater and Sal Lauria as unindicted coconspirators. By definition, what's in there satisfies Twombly and, is it, Iqbal?

THE COURT: Twombly and Iqbal.

MR. OBERLANDER: Whatever it is, it by definition satisfies that because somebody had to think there was probable cause to return that. And in there, whoever wrote it, this is the organization, this is the conspiracy. Why would I --

THE COURT: Let's just -- I'm going to stop you here.

MR. OBERLANDER: Okay. You want me to --

THE COURT: This sounds like more argument about why your pleading is sufficient.

MR. OBERLANDER: To speed it up, I can speed it up, if you could rule with preliminary papers, however you could do it, on the statute of limitations issue, which is law bound, there's not a whole lot of factual dispute in there. He says conviction becomes final means 1998. I say it means 2009. You know, if you really want the truth, the way to speed this up is to get rid of that issue because if you rule that the statute of limitations ran out in 2002, why am I amending a substantive pleading where there is no time to do it?

THE COURT: Well, and frankly, the Twombly and Iqbal motions, although I've granted one in my short tenure on the bench, usually they are something attorneys feel compelled to

make. But Twombly and Iqbal are not as exacting as people might fear.

So, but as I recall, though, the issue was not just the Twombly, Iqbal, and as I just heard from counsel, there's also the issue of substantive RICO and predicate, the predicate defense issue, and as I recall, there were two other RICO issues that you didn't mention in your argument but that are in your papers. You don't need to go into them now.

So I think the most efficient thing to do is to go ahead with the motion to dismiss. I think you should put all of the arguments in the motion to dismiss. In the schedule that I put in place, once you get the motion to dismiss, if you want to amend, and just look at the scheduling order, rather than respond, you can do that.

But let me just suggest to everybody that the Twombly, Iqbal arguments, particularly in cases where there's a lot of factual information known, generally aren't successful. There may be other deficiencies in the pleading, substantive law deficiencies in the pleading, such as those you referred to in your letter, but I wouldn't spend too much time on the Twombly, Iqbal issues.

MR. OBERLANDER: Then I'd rather amend first, only because I can make the pleading shorter and clearer, period.

THE COURT: As to the alleged deficiencies?

MR. OBERLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. By all means.

MR. OBERLANDER: And it just cuts a whole iteration out of this.

THE COURT: Let's do that. Fine.

MR. OBERLANDER: I just thought before I even do that, if he makes a motion for partial summary judgment or full on the issue of statute of limitations because --

THE COURT: If I were confident that he was right on the statute of limitations, I would say that. Frankly, I don't know the law; so I would rather hear all of the arguments at once. But if you are offering to make your complaint more clear with respect to the alleged deficiencies, go for it. I would not add a lot of detail for the sake of Twombly, Iqbal.

MR. OBERLANDER: No, no, other way around. All I want you to do, if you'll forgive me, your Honor, is accept the following, that rather than have to sit and quote 150 pages of somebody else's document, there is case law in the Second Circuit that says if I incorporate allegations in an indictment or something by reference without attaching it to the actual complaint, it's still proper.

If the Court would allow me to do that and say that the description of the enterprise is exactly as contained in paragraphs 8 through 7, without having to attach a whole thing this thick to it, that would seem --

THE COURT: You would amend the complaint to do that?

I mean, it would be hard to read in that case. I mean, if 1 there is Second Circuit case law that says you can do that, do 2 3 whatever Second Circuit case law says you can do. So let me 4 just make sure I understand. You do want to amend that? 5 MR. OBERLANDER: I want to amend the complaint so that 6 it becomes a paragon of short, concise RICO conspiracy pleading 7 because we are basing our case primarily on 1962-D, not C, on 8 conspiracy. 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. OBERLANDER: Primarily. 11 THE COURT: Which was clear from your letter. 12 MR. OBERLANDER: And, therefore, I want to make it a 13 paragon of clarity that we are alleging that Mr. Palagonia 14 committed multiple acts of securities fraud in the operation of 15 a RICO enterprise, which is exactly what --THE COURT: I understand. And that these fellows were 16 17 part. 18 MR. OBERLANDER: And that's all I have to get. 19 THE COURT: Okay. How soon can you file an amended 20 complaint? 21 MR. OBERLANDER: Two weeks? 22 THE COURT: Okay. So let's set that two-week date. 23 MR. OBERLANDER: Excuse me. We already have a 24 schedule. Why don't we just add --25 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll do -- just, I need to put

dates into my order. So we'll do July 30th for the amended complaint, and then do you want to bump everything else by one month?

MR. OBERLANDER: No.

THE COURT: No.

MR. OBERLANDER: The rule is 21 days. I don't care how long he takes. It's with respect to 21 or 28.

MR. MOBARGHA: I can file a motion to dismiss in 21 days after that time.

THE COURT: Okay. So we have July 30th for the amended complaint, and then we have three -- You want three weeks? We can do it shorter, if you want shorter.

MR. MOBARGHA: No, three weeks is fine.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's August 20th for the motion to dismiss. And then is two weeks good for a response?

Okay. August 20th. September 3rd for response.

September 10th for reply.

We need an initial pretrial conference. I know that sounds crazy since we are here, but I would like an initial pretrial conference, where you would submit a case management plan and a status letter, although, I'm not sure what you'll put in the status letter, but pursuant to my previous order which spells all that out. Why don't we do that, why don't we do it October 1st.

MR. OBERLANDER: May I ask a question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. OBERLANDER: Much web space has been devoted to the, what in my day we called the rocket docket approach of your orders, including that we are supposed to be e-mailed if there's a motion unresolved after 60 days.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OBERLANDER: The dates that you're picking here are essentially so close to resolution of the motion to dismiss that maybe it would be better to just hold the pretrial conferences in abeyance until you dispose of that motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: What I'm hoping to, but I can't promise it, is I may be able to either hear oral argument or rule orally on October 1st; so we can accomplish a lot of things on that day.

MR. OBERLANDER: There's a reason I ask, for the sake of my client's bill.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. OBERLANDER: Which is that sometimes in securities fraud cases, damage computations are very, very expensive and very detailed. And when you are dealing with damages which are in vicarious liability and you're saying, well, that judge already ordered them to be paid a million and a half by Palagonia; therefore, my damage claim against you is that million and a half, that ought to do it.

So I'm asking in advance that when we head into a conference, which I think paragraph 5 of your seven typical rules says a damage computation analogous to 26(a)(1.c.2), if I'm not mistaken, that we be allowed to make it relatively casual without having to spend --

THE COURT: Yes, that's fine. And, in fact, you already have a relatively casual damages description in one of these letters.

MR. OBERLANDER: I tried to do everything I could.

THE COURT: You can cut and paste it.

MR. OBERLANDER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MOBARGHA: Your Honor, one last issue I'd like to address is some of the allegations in the complaint, I felt, were scurrilous and intended only to harass and humiliate Mr. Sater and his late, deceased father. So I just ask if counsel does not amend and take those allegations out of the amended complaint, part of my motion to dismiss, I will also be filing in conjunction with it a motion to strike some of the allegations in the complaint.

So I just wanted to give opposing counsel some advance notice to use a little bit more discretion, and to actually plead relevant allegations rather than a history of Russian Mafia in Brooklyn, which is completely irrelevant and unsubstantiated. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So thank you, counsel. Please, you can have your discussion afterwards, but thank you. Okay. So I think that's everything on this final conference. And is there anything else we need to address here? MR. OBERLANDER: No, I think that's it. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. From defense, anything? Thanks very much. Okay. MR. LISTON: Thank you. (Adjourned)